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Introduction 
The UK has had a long relationship with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It was one of the 
founding states of the Council of Europe in 1949, ratified the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1951 and accepted the right of individual petition to the court in 1966. Up until the end of 
2017 the Court has delivered more than 450 judgments concerning the UK and these have varied in the 
impact each has had at the national level. Some have been static by either helping to preserve the status 
quo or providing a remedy to the applicant but prompting no wider change. Others have been dynamic 
and facilitated the improvement of laws, policies and practices in the light of human rights 
considerations.1 At the present time, the relationship between the UK and the Court is essentially a 
static one. The Court and its jurisprudence operate as a disincentive where breaches of Convention 
rights are contemplated. Where a violation is found, the Court will usually grant a remedy to the 
applicant and this will be implemented by the UK but will not result in any wider change. Or it might be 
that a finding of no violation by the Court supports the government’s position and helps it to resist 
reform on issues such as the regulation of political advertising or the policing of demonstrations.  
Instances where a judgment of the Court instigates a process of change or progress in the UK are now 
very rare. But this has not always been the case. Considering the jurisprudence of the Court in five-year 
blocks since 1975 until the present, it possible to see the fluctuations in the relationship between the 
Court and the UK over a long period of time and to determine the periods when the relationship was 
dynamic, and when it was not, and also to identify what external factors might have played a role. For 
example, vastly improved national human rights protection via the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) since 
2000 has clearly contributed to the evolution of a more static relationship as has the recent criticism of 
the Court emanating from senior UK politicians. Certain indicators can clearly predict the conditions for 
a dynamic relationship and others show that the relationship is destined to be a static one. The purpose 
of this article is to trace the evolution of the relationship between the UK and the ECtHR from dynamic 
to static, and to explain how it has reached this point.  
A framework for assessment 
Categorising more than 50 years of jurisprudence into neat boxes is a complex task and there are some 
judgments which do not fit neatly into either the ‘static’ or ‘dynamic’ categories. The relationship 
between the UK and the ECtHR is described as ‘static’ where the status quo is essentially preserved. This 
can arise in three ways. The existence of the ECtHR and its body of jurisprudence operates as a strong 
disincentive where UK authorities are contemplating a breach of Convention rights.2 However, as this 
                                                             
1 On the distinction between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ impact see further M. Amos, ‘The Value of the European Court 
of Human Rights to the United Kingdom’ (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 763-785. 
2 K. Alter The New Terrain of International Law (2014) at 23. 
2 
 
article concerns the impact of the judgments over a period of time, this type of static impact is not 
considered. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this article, the ECtHR can hold the UK 
accountable for its acts incompatible with Convention rights, even if this does not prompt more 
widespread change at the national level.3 Finally, the ECtHR can help the UK government to maintain the 
status quo in the face of pressure for change.4 
The relationship between the UK and the ECtHR is described as ‘dynamic’ where it produces change or 
progress. The UK may prompted by a judgment to improve existing laws, policies or procedures in order 
to comply with the ECHR. Or, less relevant for the purposes of this article, the jurisprudence of the Court 
might encourage the adoption of entirely new laws, policies and procedures. This potential of the Court 
for prompting change is a key finding of Alter: 
ICs [international courts] are new political actors on the domestic and international stage. Their 
international nature allows ICs to circumvent domestic legal and political barriers and to create 
legal change across borders. Their legal nature allows ICs to provoke political change through 
legal reinterpretation and to tap into diffuse support for the rule of law and pressure 
governments. Their legal and international nature allows litigants to harness multilateral 
resources and to knit together broader constituencies of support.5 
The period of time analysed in this article starts in 1975 with the first judgment of the Court concerning 
the UK, Golder v UK6 and ends in 2017 with the judgment in Ndidi v UK7. In total this is 454 judgments. 
Not included are judgments which did not concern the merits but only calculation of the award of just 
satisfaction and judgments where a friendly settlement was reached. Each judgment may concern more 
than one applicant but the number of judgments per year has been counted, not the number of 
applicants. Also not included are the decisions of the European Commission on Human Rights which 
gave its first decision concerning the UK in 1956 and ceased its work in 1998. The following table gives 
the number of judgments per each five-year block. 










2015-2017 (3 years) 31 
                                                             
3 A. Williams, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, the EU and the UK: confronting a heresy’, 24 EJIL 
(2013) 1157 at 1184. 
4 K. Alter, n.3 above, at 29. 
5 K. Alter, op cit, at 5. Simmons reaches the same conclusion in relation to treaty commitments rather than the 
oversight of an international court. See B. A. Simmons Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009) page 8. 
6 (Appl. No. 4451/70), 21 February 1975 





Given there was no codified constitution or bill of rights at the national level over this period, and the 
very small number of five judgments, it is not surprising that almost every judgment over this period had 
a dynamic impact. Judgments where violations of the ECHR were found concerned a prisoner’s access to 
court and contact with a solicitor8; judicial corporal punishment on the Isle of Man9; and contempt of 
court laws which were found to be incompatible with Article 1010. All were fairly swiftly complied with 
despite some discussion that the Isle of Man judgment would plunge the UK into ‘constitutional crisis’, 
this did not eventuate. Much more controversial over this period was the interstate judgment in Ireland 
v UK11 where although the UK’s derogation from the Convention was upheld, it was found that methods 
of interrogation adopted by UK security forces acting in pursuance of emergency powers were inhuman 
and degrading and in violation of Article 3. But the impact of the judgment was lessened by the fact that 
Prime Minister Ted Heath had in 1972 announced that the five techniques would no longer be used and 
the reaction to the judgment was generally neutral although there was some criticism of the Irish 
government for continuing to the Court with the case despite the findings of the Commission.12 The only 
static judgment over this period was Handyside13 where the Court afforded the UK a wide margin of 
appreciation over its laws regulating obscene publications and found no violation of Article 10 arising 
from the conviction of the publishers.  
Criticism of the Court over this period was minimal although there was a growing awareness that the UK 
was consistently topping the league table of the number of applications brought against each state. This 
was perceived to be not the fault of the Court but the fault of the UK itself given the situations in 
Northern Ireland, the expulsions in East Africa and the absence of a national remedy. A small number of 
dynamic changes were achieved, but a small number of applications were determined. The problems 
caused by the lack of a national remedy were fully appreciated and there was very little hostility towards 
the Court. 
1980-1984 
This period proceeded in much the same fashion. There were only seven judgments and all resulted in 
dynamic change at the national level ranging from the reform of closed shop agreements14 and mental 
health law15 to changes in rules concerning prisoners’ correspondence and prison disciplinary 
proceedings.16 Three judgments resulted in very significant change. The judgment in Dudgeon17 led to 
amendment of the law of Northern Ireland so that homosexual acts between two consenting male 
                                                             
8 Golder, op cit 
9 Tyrer v UK (Appl. No. 5956/72) 25 April 1978 
10 Sunday Times v UK (No.1) (Appl. No. 6538/74) 26 April 1979. 
11 (Appl. No. 5310/71), 18 January 1978 
12 The Times, Editorial, 14 February 1977 
13 (Appl. No. 5493/72), 7 December 1976 
14 Young James and Webster v UK (Appl. No. 7601/76), 13 August 1981 
15 X v UK (Appl. No. 7215/75), 5 November 1981 
16 Silver v UK (Appl. No. 5947/72), 25 March 1981 and Campbell and Fell v UK (Appl. No. 7819/77), 28 June 1984. 
17 (Appl. No. 7525/76) 22 October 1981 
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adults in private was no longer an offence. The judgment in Campbell and Cosans18 finding that corporal 
punishment at school was in violation of Article 2 Protocol 1, but not Article 3, was influential in the 
passage of the Education Act 1986 which abolished corporal punishment in state schools. And the 
judgment in Malone19 led to the Interception of Communications Act 1985 to regulate the interception 
of communications for the first time. But it should not be assumed that the process of change following 
a judgment of the Court was straightforward. This period was characterised by lots of discussion 
between different stakeholders about how to best implement the judgment with the judgment itself 
playing a very important role in the discussion leading up to change. There was enormous respect for 
the Court and a shared view that its judgments were important and should be implemented. For 
example, the judgment in Campbell and Cosans concerning corporal punishment in schools, caused 
considerable debate summed up in the following quote from The Times in 1982: 
The decision, which must be respected for its cogency in law and by reason of our respect for 
the treaty, nonetheless poses problems . . . It is a pity that the European Court could not 
accompany the right of parents to protect their children from corporal punishment with a 
corresponding duty to bring up children in a disciplined enough way to make it more likely that 
they respect authority at school.20 
Teachers unions were split over the issue and the Minister for Schools at the time was in support of 
corporal punishment. The government’s original plan to grant parents the right to decide was rejected 
by the House of Lords and eventually, in 1986, the abolition of corporal punishment in state schools was 
finally achieved. Throughout the debate, respect for the Court was evident although some criticisms 
were made of the Court by Conservative Party politicians which were eventually to become mainstream.  
Conservative politician Fred Silvester MP wrote as follows: 
This is an extraordinary power. Lawyers, nominated by 13 countries, exercise power over the 
most central political decision of a nation . . the human rights apparatus exercises this political 
judgment but without reference to democratic institutions elected for this purpose. It assumes 
that even a country with a free press cannot be trusted to preserve its own freedom.21 
He called for the UK to end the right of individual petition and later in 1980 launched a campaign to that 
effect. Similar sentiments were expressed by Enoch Powell, Ulster Unionist MP, who spoke of Britain’s 
‘serf masters’ the European Court of Human Rights and the European Community.22 However, these 
ideas were not yet supported by government.  
One finding of violation over this period did not result in dynamic change, at least in the short term. In 
both Silver and Campbell and Fell the Court held that Article 13, the right to an effective remedy, had 
been violated as the applicants had no effective remedy available at the national level. But this part of 
the Court’s judgment, in both cases, was ignored by the UK government and also by the Committee of 
Ministers. Whilst debates about a UK bill of rights, or incorporation of the Convention into national law, 
were continuing at the national level, the observations of the government of the day show a mild 
                                                             
18 (Appl. No. 7511/76) 25 February 1982 
19 (Appl. No. 8691/79), 2 August 1984 
20 The Times, 26 February 1982, page 11 
21 The Times, 17 March 1980, page 14 
22 As reported in The Times, 19 September 1981, page 2 
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hostility to the idea and explain why this part of the Court’s judgment was not addressed and also why 
the Court itself changed its mind on Article 13 in 1985. The Lord Chancellor at the time, Lord Elwyn 
Jones, had said in 1977 that human rights ‘were not obviously abused’ in the UK and that the courts 
were ‘far from backward’ in ensuring that the powers entrusted by Parliament to the executive were 
not exceeded. He doubted that there was a need for any further inquiry into a bill of rights suggesting 
that a better, course might be a general review of the law to see where it ‘fell short of the convention’s 
ideals’ and then remedy any defects.23 
The 1977 and 1981 bills to incorporate the ECHR into national law made little progress in Parliament 
despite the fact, as Alan Beith MP explained to Parliament in 1981, that this would enable grievances to 
be tested in national courts rather than ‘continually having to wash its dirty linen in Strasbourg’.24 There 
were also calls by senior judges, including Lord Denning, for the ECHR to be incorporated.25 But without 
the support of the ECtHR, and the Committee of Ministers on Article 13, little progress was made. 
1985-1989 
Over this period the number of judgments increased with 19 judgments, more than the whole of the 
previous ten years. This period was also characterised by an increase in static judgments either helping 
the UK to maintain the status quo or holding it accountable, but not prompting any further change. For 
example, the judgment in Rees26 helped the UK government to maintain its refusal to legally recognise a 
change in sex. There was also a reversal of the Court’s previous position on Article 13. It did find in 
Abdulaziz27 that the UK’s refusal to allow the applicants to join spouses lawfully settled was in breach of 
Article 14 with Article 8, and Article 13 since the UK had not incorporated the Convention into its 
domestic law.28 However, one year later in its judgment in James29 it found no violation of Article 13 
stating as follows: 
The Convention is not part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom, nor does there exist any 
constitutional procedure permitting the validity of the laws to be challenged for non-observance 
of fundamental rights. There thus was, and could be, no domestic remedy in respect of the 
applicants’ complaint that the leasehold reform legislation itself does not measure up to the 
standards of the Convention and its Protocols. The Court, however, concurs with the 
Commission that Article 13 does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting 
State’s laws to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the 
Convention or to equivalent domestic legal norms.30 
This reasoning continued to be applied by the Court and no further violations of Article 13 were found 
over this period thereby removing an important weapon from the hands of those campaigning for 
                                                             
23 As reported in The Times, 4 February 1977, page 4 
24 As reported in The Times, 9 May 1981, page 3 
25 As reported in The Times, 11 December 1979, page 2 
26 Rees v UK (Appl. No. 9532/81), 17 October 1986 
27 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkdandali v UK (Appl. No. 9214/80) 28 May 1985 
28 At [93] 
29 James v UK (Appl. No. 8793/79), 21 February 1986 
30 At [85].  
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incorporation.31 On these two issues the conclusion of the Court matched the views of the government. 
The UK was not ready, at least according to the government of the day, for legal recognition of change in 
sex or for incorporation of the ECHR into national law. On these two issues, the result was static. But 
there were a number of judgments over this period leading to dynamic change. A series of judgments 
relating to child care and wardship where violations of Articles 6 and 8 were found informed important 
changes in this area including the Children Act 1989.32 The judgment in Abdulaziz led to changes in the 
immigration rules and the removal of a difference in treatment between husbands and wives although it 
was made more difficult for husbands to bring wives to the UK in order to achieve equality between the 
two groups. The judgment in Weeks33 that some aspects of life sentencing arrangements were 
compatible with Article 5 but others were not, was the start of an ongoing battle between the 
government and the Court over sentencing, something the government was not prepared to adequately 
address at this point. And the judgment in Brogan34 that there had been a violation of Article 5(3) 
resulting from not bringing a suspected terrorist promptly before a judge resulted in the UK entering a 
derogation to Article 5. 
The judgment with the most lasting impact during this period was Soering.35 Here the Court determined 
that there may be a breach of Article 3 where substantial grounds had been shown for believing that a 
person subject to extradition faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment in the requesting country.36 The government informed the Committee of Ministers that it had 
secured an undertaken from the US that the applicant would not be subject to the death penalty but 
there were no undertakings as to how this issue would  be dealt with in future. It was actually not 
properly addressed in national law until the HRA came into force on 2 October 2000, but from this point 
onwards its impact was dynamic, lasting, and significant. 
There was still considerable respect for the Court during this period. Following the judgment in 
Abdulaziz the responsible minister stated that the UK accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and would 
abide by its decision.37 Margaret Thatcher, then Prime Minister, stated in response to the news that 
notorious murderer Myra Hindley would complain to the Court, that the UK had accepted Article 46 of 
the Convention and therefore accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in all matters concerning interpretation 
of the Convention.38 The right of individual petition was renewed in 1985 with little discussion. 
But, echoing sentiments from the earlier period, the judgment in Abdulaziz did give rise to some 
criticism of the Court in particular, that it was overstepping the boundaries of appropriate judicial 
behaviour: 
That characteristic of Strasbourg justice induced the guardian-interpreters of the convention to 
pass general judgment on public policy to an extent that is foreign to our own judicial system. It 
draws judges into the false position of deciding questions that properly lie with ministers and 
                                                             
31 See, for example, Lithgow v UK (Appl. No. 9006/80), 8 July 1986; Boyle and Rice v UK (Appl. No. 9659/82), 27 
April 1988; and Soering v UK (Appl. No. 14038/88), 7 July 1989. 
32 See, for example, O v UK (Appl. No. 9276/81), 8 July 1987. 
33 Weeks v UK (Appl. No. 9787/82), 2 March 1987. 
34 Brogan v UK (Appl. No. 11209/84), 29 November 1988 
35 Soering v UK (Appl. No. 14038/88), 7 July 1989 
36 At [91] 
37 As reported in The Times, 29 May 1985, page 1. 
38 As reported in The Times, 13 June 1985, page 1 
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legislators. It blurs the constitutional separation of powers. It transmutes rhetoric into law by 
way of the aggrandizement of judges.39 
The government’s resistance to incorporation of the Convention continued and was supported by the 
Court’s change in its interpretation of Article 13. Undeterred, those supporting a bill of rights continued 
to campaign and focussed on how a bill of rights would enable UK courts to interpret the ECHR rather 
than the ECtHR. A bill to incorporate the ECHR was introduced into Parliament in 1986 but failed without 
the support of the government. When it was reintroduced later that year it was reported that the 
government was divided over the issue with opponents concerned that it would threaten the supremacy 
of Parliament and allow courts to make political judgments, something which was seen as unnecessary 
given there was no evidence of risk to the ‘liberties of the subject’.40 
1990-1994 
This period was similar to the preceding one with 21 judgments delivered and a fairly even split between 
static and dynamic judgments. There was no change in the Court’s approach to the legal recognition of 
change in sex41 and the national debate made no progress despite a cross party group of MPs trying to 
get it back on the national agenda. In Costello-Roberts42 it held by a narrow margin that ‘slippering’ 
(being hit by a shoe on the buttocks) at an independent school was not in violation of Articles 3 or 8. 
This caused some disappointment for campaigners for change given the inequality between treatment 
in state and non-state schools. The derogation in place to facilitate various laws dealing with the 
situation in Northern Ireland was upheld43 and this also caused some human rights groups to be 
concerned that the Court was becoming more restrictive and more conservative in its judgments, 
particularly where the subject of challenge concerned terrorism.44 And the Court continued its 
endorsement of some aspects of life sentencing arrangements for the time being.45 The media enjoyed a 
significant victory with the Court determining that the contempt of court injunctions imposed to prevent 
publication of the details of the book ‘Spycatcher’ were incompatible with Article 10 but although 
damages were paid, there was no wider change generated by this judgment. The Court continued its 
interpretation of Article 13 holding that whilst there were limitations to the powers of national courts 
exercising judicial review, the courts were able to provide ‘an effective degree of control’ sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 13.46 
There were a number of judgments which led to dynamic change including changes to the availability of 
legal aid in criminal appeals.47 Changes were made to powers in Northern Ireland so that arrest without 
warrant had to take place with ‘reasonable grounds’ for suspicion.48 And the Court found problems with 
life sentencing arrangements as the applicants were not able to have the lawfulness of their detention 
                                                             
39 Editorial, The Times, 1 June 1985, page 9 
40 As reported in The Times, 12 December 1986, page 19. 
41 Cossey v UK (Appl. No. 10843/84), 27 September 1990 
42 Costello-Roberts v UK (Appl. No. 13134/87), 25 March 1993 
43 Brannigan and McBride v UK (Appl. No. 14553/89), 25 May 1993 
44 As report in The Times, 27 May 1993 
45 Wynne v UK (Appl. No. 15484/89) 18 July 1994 
46 Powell and Rayner v UK (Appl. No. 9310/81), 21 February 1990 
47 See, for example, Granger v UK (Appl. No. 11932/86), 28 March 1990 
48 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (Appl. No. 12244/86), 30 August 1990 
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decided at reasonable intervals.49 In response, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 granted discretionary life 
sentence prisoners the power to require the Home Secretary to refer the case to the Parole Board which 
had the power to direct release. The Board was also granted oral hearing and disclosure powers. This 
caused some concern but the decision was taken in 1991 that government ministers would relinquish 
their right to decide when prisoners, apart from murderers, serving discretionary life sentences could be 
released. Politicisation of this issue had not yet occurred and during this period some notorious 
convicted murderers brought applications to the Court including Myra Hindley and the murderers of 
toddler James Bulger. 
National politics concerning the Court were similar to the preceding period. National judges were 
beginning to take the jurisprudence of the Court into account in their decision making and the 
government was still supportive of the Court although in some instances it was now paying 
compensation to the applicants rather than making the changes which may have prevented the same 
problem arising again. The debate over a bill of rights or incorporation of the ECHR continued with the 
record of the UK before the Court becoming a major part of the arguments of campaigners for reform. 
In an important development, it was reported in 1992 that John Smith, the new leader of the Labour 
Party, wanted to make incorporation party policy.50 However, the government of the day continued to 
maintain that this was not necessary as rights were already protected in national law and Parliament 
was the best placed to determine rights and liberties. Even the President of the Court, Rolf Ryssdal, was 
urging the UK to incorporate and claimed it would have a bigger influence on shaping jurisprudence 
should it do so. 
Over this period the UK had settled into a comfortable acceptance that the Court would most likely find 
a violation of the ECHR, should an application be made to it, and that the government would pay 
compensation and everything would carry on as normal. Some efforts were even made in Parliament to 
avert successful challenges although the attempt to equalise the homosexual and heterosexual ages of 
consent did not succeed, despite the prospect of an unfavourable Court judgment. It was reported in 
March 1994 that the Home Office had refused to agree to the proposal which would lead to the Court 
becoming full-time and grant individuals a permanent and automatic right to bring applications. But the 
government quickly backed down and agreed to sign Protocol 11. 
1995-1999 
Over this five-year period the number of judgments doubled with 51 delivered. The Court was becoming 
well known and in 1993 it was made possible for lawyers to take cases to the Court on a ‘no win no fee’ 
basis. In 1997 a new Labour Party government was elected on the promise of incorporating the ECHR 
into national law through a ‘Human Rights Act’ (HRA). One of the major motivations for the HRA was to 
allow UK courts to determine the issues for themselves without the involvement of the ECtHR. The 
assumption was that going forward, most issues would be settled in the UK and the ECtHR would no 
longer have as much influence. The Human Rights Act 1998 came into force in 2000 and whilst it had no 
impact on the applications before the Court for some time, its passage clearly emboldened the Court in 
some of the judgments in made over this period such as those concerning the ban on homosexuals 
serving in the armed forces, the retention of sentencing powers by politicians and ongoing problems 
                                                             
49 Thynne, Wilson and Gunnell v UK (Appl. No. 12009/86), 25 October 1990 
50 As reported in The Times, 15 August 1992 
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with court martials. This was a period where many judgments had a dynamic impact. The HRA also 
enabled the UK to respond more effectively to the Committee of Ministers given in many instances it 
would enable judges to solve the incompatibility identified by the Court.51 In contrast to previous years, 
the Court found that the pre-HRA era was essentially in violation of Article 13 concluding in Chahal that 
removal from the UK would be in violation of Articles 3, 5(4) and 13 given the deficiencies in the removal 
and habeas corpus proceedings. This judgment resulted in widespread reform of removal in the national 
security context and the establishment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and apparatus 
to hear this type of case. In relation to Article 13, the Court stated as follows: 
. . . given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treatment 
materialised and the importance the Court attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective 
remedy under Article 13 requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial 
grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. This scrutiny must be carried 
out without regard to what the person may have done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived 
threat to the national security of the expelling State.52 
Judgments of the court over this period spurred reform of: court martials53; the use of national security 
certificates in civil proceedings54; the use of evidence obtained by compulsory powers55; the right to 
vote in European elections for those living in Gibraltar, a dependent territory of the UK56; the defence of 
‘reasonable chastisement’ in relation to the punishment of a child;57 the Home Secretary’s sentencing 
powers58; the absence of legal aid for some court proceedings59; interception of communications60; 
orders for the disclosure of a journalist’s source61; and the size of damages awards for a successful claim 
of libel.62 Two Article 2 judgments had far reaching implications for the interpretation and application of 
Article 2 not only in the UK but for all Contracting States. In McCann63 a violation of Article 2 was found 
as the planning of the security forces did not meet the requirements of Article 2. Compensation was 
paid but no further information was provided by the government. And in Osman64 the Court developed 
its Article 2 positive duty jurisprudence finding that the police had a positive duty to protect although it 
had not been violated on the facts of the application. 
                                                             
51 See, for example, Bowman v UK (Appl. No. 141/1996/760/961), 19 February 1998. 
52 Chahal v UK (Appl. No. 22414/93) 15 November 1996 at [151]. 
53 See, for example, Findlay v UK (Appl. No. 22107/93), 25 February 1997 
54 Tinnelly & Sons v UK (Appl. No. 62/1997/846/1052-1053) 10 July 1998 
55 Saunders v UK (Appl. No. 19187/91), 17 December 1996 
56 Matthews v UK (Appl. No. 24833/94), 18 February 1999 
57 A v UK (Appl. No. 100/1997/884/1096), 23 September 1998 – although this was not finally remedied to the 
satisfaction of the Committee of Ministers until 2004. 
58 See, for example, V v UK (Appl. No. 24888/94), 16 December 1999. 
59 See, for example, Benham v UK (Appl. No. 19380/92), 10 June 1996. 
60 Halford v UK (Appl. No. 20605/92), 25 June 1997 although this was not finally remedied until the coming into 
force of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
61 Goodwin v UK (Appl. No 17488/90), 27 March 1996. 
62 Tolstoy v UK (Appl. No. 18139/91), 13 July 1995. 
63 McCann v UK (Appl. No. 18984/91) 27 September 1995 
64 Osman v UK (Appl. No. 87/1997/871/1083), 28 October 1998 
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The highest profile judgments of this period, leading to dynamic change, were those challenging the ban 
on homosexual personnel in the armed forces.65 In the two judgments the Court concluded that the 
investigations conducted into the applicants’ sexual orientation and their discharge on the grounds of 
their homosexuality was in violation of Article 8. In January 2000, in response to the judgment, the 
government lifted the ban. Similar to its conclusion in Chahal, and obviously emboldened by the passage 
of the HRA at the national level, the Court also found a violation of Article 13 as the applicants had no 
effective remedy available in relation to the violation of their right to respect for their private lives. It 
observed as follows: 
. . . even assuming that the essential complaints of the applicants before this Court were before 
and considered by the domestic courts, the threshold at which the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal could find the Ministry of Defence policy irrational was placed so high that it effectively 
excluded any consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference 
with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate to the national 
security and public order aims pursued, principles which lie at the heart of the Court’s analysis 
of complaints under Article 8 of the Convention.66 
Whilst there was a lot of dynamism over this period, there were also some static judgments. The Court 
was developing a sense of what change the national system would accommodate and what it would not. 
On some of these issues it was to later change its mind. For example, in In Buckley67, the first of the 
planning decisions concerning gypsies to be challenged, the applicant argued that the prevailing 
legislative arrangements prevented gypsies from pursuing their traditional lifestyle. No violation of the 
Convention was found. And in Stubbings68 the Court decided that there was no violation of the 
Convention in prohibiting the applicants from bringing legal proceedings in relation to childhood sexual 
abuse given the offences had occurred outside the time limit set to initiate proceedings. Sensitivity to 
national prudishness and morality, harking back to Handyside, was also evident over this period with the 
Court’s conclusion in Wingrove69 that it was compatible with Article 10 for a film to be refused a 
classification certificate as it offended the criminal law of blasphemy. Similarly it was held in Laskey70 
that the conviction of the applicants for criminal offences as a result of consensual activities during 
sado-masochistic encounters was compatible with Article 8. The Court also maintained its earlier view 
finding in Sheffield & Horsham v UK71 that the non-recognition of a change in sex was not in violation of 
the Convention and that Article 8 did not impose a positive obligation on the state to recognise a change 
in sex. 
Whilst interest in the Court continued to grow, it was over this period that the government’s tone began 
to change from supportive to critical. Following the judgment in McCann in 1995, Michael Heseltine, the 
Conservative Party Deputy Prime Minister, denounced a ‘ludicrous verdict that would give ‘succour to 
terrorism’. It was reported that the government would ignore the suggestion implicit in the finding that 
Britain should change its way of conducting anti-terrorist operations. He ‘did not rule out the possibility 
of Britain withdrawing recognition from the convention on human rights’. Opposition politicians did not 
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join in the criticism of the Court and compensation was eventually paid to the families.72 But the 
criticisms started to grow. In November 1996 it was reported that Conservative Party ministers had 
called for the Court to reform itself with changes in the way the judges were chosen and how they reach 
decisions. ‘It wants the court to pay more heed to British circumstances and traditions.’: 
Ministers feel the court has gone beyond its remit by dealing with specific matters that should 
be left to member states. Britain wants the judges to adopt a more tolerant approach, taking 
account of ‘the decisions of local democratic institutions and tribunals, which are best placed to 
assess issues of this kind’.73 
The Court did not push any boundaries, particularly with respect to the non-legal recognition of change 
in sex, around this time. With the election of a new Labour government in 1997 and its promise of 
incorporation of the ECHR, there was a chance that this new critical stance would be modified. And in 
the short term this was the case. In 1998 the government did not contest the application brought to the 
court by a widower claiming that men should have the same benefits as women. It was also making 
changes, such as equalising the law on the age of consent, to prevent successful challenges in the ECtHR. 
Following the judgment of the Court in 1999 finding a violation of Article 6 in the trial of the two 
children who had killed a small child74 Home Secretary Jack Straw stated that the government accepted 
the ruling but he did not immediately outline the changes that would be made. This did not prevent an 
outpouring of rage from others. Former Home Secretary Michael Howard attacked the Court directly 
stating that it was unbelievable that it had been used by the two applicants. By contrast, the judgment 
concerning the armed forces ban on homosexuality was well received. In a statement in October 1999 
the Labour Minister for Defence said that ‘the European court had made its judgment and ‘we will 
implement it’.  
2000-2004 
Given the delays involved in bringing an application to the Court, the coming into force of the HRA did 
not immediately alleviate the large number applications flowing from the UK to the Court although it did 
divert some attention towards the national courts. This period was the peak of activity for the UK before 
the Court with 124 judgments delivered although many of these applications concerned the same 
issues, such as surveillance or court martials. Also, in many instances, the problem had already been 
resolved at the national level leaving the Court only to award compensation. Over this time the Labour 
government did attempt to clean up the mess created by the absence of national human rights 
protection and very slow change on other issues such as sentencing, prisoners, policing and court 
martials. Both the HRA and the new Data Protection Act 1998 allowed the government to report to the 
Committee of Ministers that general measures to remedy the violation found had been taken. 
Meanwhile the Conservative Party used its conference in October 2004 to propose the repeal or reform 
of the HRA as it had led to the adoption of ‘European rights’. 
As also noted in the preceding period, the new optimism towards human rights law at the national level 
emboldened the Court and there was a shift to dynamic judgments over this period. However, it was 
also during this period that the Court delivered its most controversial judgment ever concerning the UK 
finding that its blanket ban on prisoner voting was incompatible with Article 3 Protocol 1.75 The 
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application was referred to the Grand Chamber, a mechanism the UK government was increasingly to 
avail itself of, and that judgment and its impact is considered in the next section. 
Many of the same areas where violations had been found by the Court in the past were back for 
consideration and judgments of the Court led to reforms in: surveillance practices76; court martials77; the 
criminal trials of children and young people78; protection from eviction for gypsies and travellers79; 
protection of union membership80; equalisation of benefits for widows and widowers81; and improved 
protection for the lives of prisoners and better investigations into deaths in prison.82 
Sentencing practices continued to cause difficulties for the UK before the Court. Following a series of 
adverse judgments83 the Secretary of State was prohibited from departing from recommendations of 
the Parole Board. The Parole Board was made competent to rule on the release of all mandatory life 
sentence prisoners and damages were available pursuant to Article 5(5). In 2002, in response, and 
breaking the new Labour government’s record of positive engagement with the Court, a defiant tone 
was adopted by then Home Secretary, David Blunkett. Following the judgment in Stafford84 he 
expressed his disappointment and it was reported he was adamant that politicians and not judges must 
retain the right to say how long convicted killers must serve.85  
Difficult issues were raised by the judgment in Ezeh and Connors86 where the Grand Chamber found a 
lack of independence and impartiality in prison disciplinary proceedings. Rules were put in place 
requiring reference to an adjudicator in serious cases. In such instances prisoners were also given the 
opportunity to be legally represented. The judgment in Finucane87 was one of many judgments 
concerning the failure of the UK to meet the procedural obligations inherent in Article 2 and properly 
investigate deaths which had occurred during The Troubles in Northern Ireland. This has been partly 
resolved by the establishment of the Historical Enquiries Team in late 2005 working with the Police 
Ombudsman for NI although some matters remain outstanding and are still under the consideration of 
the Committee of Ministers. 
The Court reversed its position on the legal recognition of a change in sex in its judgment in Goodwin88. 
Given the issue was already progressing through the national courts as the result of a HRA claim, it held 
that the government could ‘no longer claim that the matter falls within their margin of appreciation’ 
and that the fair balance now ‘tilts decisively in favour of the applicant’.89 The issue was eventually 
remedied by the Gender Recognition Act 2004 which came into force in 2005. 
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One of the more controversial applications over this period was that in Pretty.90 Whilst this was 
essentially a static judgment, the Court finding that the UK’s rules regarding assisted suicide were not 
incompatible with the Convention, the Court did find, by contrast to the national courts, that the issue 
was within the scope of Article 8 thereby opening up the possibility of more litigation at the national 
level. The judgment in McGonnell91 that arrangements in Guernsey for determining planning appeals 
were incompatible with independence guarantees set out in Article 6 had implications for judicial 
arrangements in the highest court, the House of Lords, meaning that the Lord Chancellor himself was 
risking a violation of Article 6 should he continue to sit on House of Lords panels. The Court also 
continued to find violations of Article 13 over this period relating to facts arising before the HRA had 
come into force.92 In response, the government was able to submit to the Committee of Ministers that 
the HRA meant that violations of the Convention could now be considered by national courts.  
Whilst dynamic judgments did dominate over this period, there were also some static ones including a 
number where the Court reconsidered facts, such as those relating to an Article 3 removal decision, and 
either found a violation or no violation with no need for further reforming measures.93 In one instance it 
clarified its judgment in Osman holding that there was no violation of Article 6 as a result of the striking 
out of negligence claims against a local authority which had failed to remove children from an abusive 
situation.94 It was also held that an inability to sue a foreign state for torture in the UK was not in 
violation of Article 3 or Article 6, a conclusion the Court would adhere to when the issue came before it 
again in future years.95 And it was held in McVicar96 that the unavailability of legal aid in defamation 
proceedings was not in violation of Articles 6 or 10. Controversy was avoided in Appleby where the 
Court held that for a private shopping centre to prohibit the distribution of leaflets with a political 
message did not mean that the state was in breach of Articles 10, 11 or 13.97  And in the Grand Chamber 
judgment in Hatton, reversing the Chamber judgment, political difficulties were avoided with the 
conclusion that night flights at Heathrow were not in violation of Article 8 rights although a violation of 
Article 13 was found.98 The government had claimed the Chamber judgment was ‘seriously flawed’. The 
Court was not willing to get involved in the national position on assisted suicide and although in its 
judgment in Pretty it found that the facts came within the scope of Article 8, it found no violations of 
Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 or 14.99 
2005-2009 
Over this period the number of judgments started to decline. Whilst 108 were delivered, more than 30 
percent concerned applications from widowers complaining about inequality of benefits when 
compared with widows, an Article 14 violation which had already been conceded by the government. 
The number of dynamic judgments was also in decline and many judgments over this period concerned 
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issues which had already been addressed such as court martials, legal aid, and aspects of criminal law 
procedure. The HRA was beginning to have an impact and many of the applications determined by the 
Court over this period had already been considered by the national courts. It was becoming clear that in 
such instances, it was unlikely, although not impossible, for the Court to reach the opposite conclusion. 
Whilst the Labour government was trying to clear the backlog, settle longstanding disputes and 
generally be respectful of the Court, some of the Court’s most controversial judgments concerning the 
UK were delivered over this period including the Grand Chamber’s conclusion that the blanket ban on 
prisoner voting was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No.1.   
Judgments with dynamic impact over this time included S and Marper100 where the Grand Chamber 
held, contrary to the House of Lords, that the blanket retention of DNA profiles and samples by police 
engaged Article 8 and was incompatible with it. This took a very long time to remedy at the national 
level with no legislation until 2012 and a clarifying judgment of the Supreme Court in 2011 where it was 
recommended the code of practice be amended to ensure compliance.101 In Dickson102, decided in 2007, 
the Grand Chamber determined that it was incompatible with Article 8 for a prisoner to be denied 
access to artificial insemination. The issue had been considered by the Court of Appeal which had found 
in favour of the government although it was a different applicant before the Court. The government 
amended the policy to include a proportionality test. The most high profile and politicised judgment 
ever concerning the UK was delivered in Hirst No.2103 Here the Grand Chamber confirmed that the UK’s 
blanket ban on prisoner voting was incompatible with Article 3 Protocol 1 prompting a national debate 
which lasted for 12 years. Only in 2017 was the issue resolved to the satisfaction of the Committee of 
Ministers with the UK promising to grant the vote to prisoners released on temporary licence and 
prisoners released on home detention curfew although it was estimated that this would only affect 100 
prisoners at any one time. 
Over this period a dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts began in earnest. One example is 
McCann104 where the Court found that the termination of a tenancy without the opportunity for the 
applicant to test the proportionality of the measure was in violation of Article 8. This was eventually 
clarified by the UK Supreme Court in its judgment in Pinnock.105 A dialogue also arose from the judgment 
in Tsfayo106 where it was held that housing benefit review boards were not independent and impartial. 
This was resolved in 2001 with the establishment of tribunals independent of the local authority but the 
issue of independence in such instances continues to cause difficulties before the national courts. 
Unusually there was also an application where a violation had been found at the national level but it was 
accepted by the Court as it contained an Article 13 claim which it is not possible to make under the HRA. 
As the violation was a result of primary legislation, the applicants had only received a declaration of 
incompatibility at the national level and no other remedy such as damages. The Court, nevertheless, 
found that the declaration of incompatibility was not a remedy incompatible with Article 13 and agreed 
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with the national court, the House of Lords, on the invalidity of the derogation and the subsequent 
violations of Article 5 and recommended Article 5(5) compensation.107  
There were also some judgments which should have resulted in dynamic change but only resulted in 
measures to satisfy the individual applicant. For example, in Financial Times108 the Court had found a 
violation of Article 10 as a result of a court order obliging the FT to provide documents for the purpose 
of identifying an anonymous source. The government paid compensation and distributed the judgment 
but did not change the law which allowed this type of order. 
There was definitely a shift towards static judgments over this time and some very controversial matters 
were found compatible with the Convention by the Court where previously, if the matter had not been 
considered at the national level, it is likely that the Court would have found a violation. One example is 
Roche109 where a claim against the Ministry of Defence was prohibited by law. The Court was clearly 
influenced by national HRA judgments concerning the same issue and found that Article 6 (access to 
court) had no application to the facts and therefore had not been violated. However, a violation of 
Article 8 was found in respect of the lack of information. The application in Evans110 raised an emotive 
issue which had already been determined against the applicant at the national level. Under national law, 
embryos the applicant had created with her former partner were to be destroyed as he had withdrawn 
his consent and she had no other chance of having her own biological children. Affording a wide margin 
of appreciation the Court found no violation of the Convention. In Saadi111 the Court reached the same 
conclusion as the national courts that immigration detention was not in violation of Article 5(1) although 
there was a violation of Article 5(2) in respect of the lack of reasons provided for detention. And in N v 
UK112 the Court agreed with the national courts, even adopting the wording utilised by the House of 
Lords, that the removal of the HIV positive applicant to Uganda was not incompatible with Article 3 as 
this was not a very exceptional case. The Court’s reluctance to get involved in national pension matters 
was evident in Carson113 where in agreement with the national courts, it found that the refusal to uprate 
the pensions of those living abroad in certain states, in line with inflation, was compatible with Article 
14. 
Whilst there had been some comments from government ministers critical of the Court in the preceding 
period, over this period the tenor of the debate became much more critical. Following a terror attack in 
London in July 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that the ‘rules of the game are changing’. 
Shortly after, Home Secretary Charles Clarke advised the judiciary not to ‘thwart efforts to deport 
foreign terrorist suspects’ and called for a review of the ECHR. In May 2006 Tony Blair launched an 
attack on human rights law and courts stating that it was time for a profound rebalancing of the debate 
on civil liberties ‘to ensure that wrongdoers pay the penalty for breaking the rules’. Meanwhile the 
Conservative Party announced its plans for a British Bill of Rights to replace the HRA although little detail 
was provided.  
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Over this period the number of judgments did fall with 88 judgments recorded. Issues before the Court 
became more complex and, in most instances, had often already been considered by national courts 
utilising the HRA. This made the task of the Court more politicised and the number of dynamic 
judgments fell although there were some and, in a few instances, these caused considerable 
controversy. 
Some judgments concerned matters where a violation had previously been found by the Court such as 
the failure to effectively investigate deaths which had occurred during The Troubles in Northern Ireland 
and there were also further judgments concerning the blanket ban on prisoner voting although the 
Court did not change its view that this was in violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1.114 There were also 
continuing problems coming to the Court concerning the release of prisoners and the operation of the 
Parole Board.115 Immigration detention became a problem the Court finding a violation of Article 5 in 
the application of Abdi116 given its conclusion that his detention was no longer for the purpose of his 
removal. And there was disagreement with national courts over sweeping stop and search powers which 
the Court found to be not in accordance with the law although its judgment resulted in swift legislative 
change.117 
Some judgments contained both static and dynamic elements. For example, in McDonald118 the Court 
concluded that a local authority’s decision to withdraw night-time care was within the scope of Article 8 
but only found a minor violation on prescribed by law grounds and did not find the withdrawal of care to 
be disproportionate overall. And in MGN Limited119 it was determined that there was no violation of 
Article 10 as a result of a national HRA privacy claim, but there was a violation as a result of the success 
fees charged by the lawyers which the unsuccessful newspaper had to pay. This issue has yet to be 
resolved to the satisfaction of the Committee of Ministers. 
In some instances the Court was making determinations which matched those already arrived at by 
courts at the national level utilising the HRA, although not in relation to the claim of the applicant before 
the Court. For example in Paulet120 it approved the later position adopted by the UK Supreme Court in 
relation to confiscation orders which had not been utilised by the national courts in relation to the 
applicant’s claim. Or the Court considered issues which had already been remedied by law at the 
national level such as its judgment in CN121 where it found a violation of Article 4 due to the absence of 
laws penalising forced labour and servitude, such laws had already been put in place by the time the 
judgment was delivered. And the discrimination against same sex partners found in JM122 has already 
been remedied by the Civil Partnerships Act 2004. 
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In other applications the Court was given the opportunity to clarify some of its own jurisprudence. For 
example, in Eweida123 it held that where Article 9 was at issue in the workplace, rather than deciding the 
applicant could accept another role or find another job, it was preferable to consider the necessity for 
the interference rather than finding no interference at all. There was no need for legislative change as 
the Court’s new interpretation was implemented by national courts. In fact, the need for legislative 
change to remedy violations became far rarer over this period. 
One of the most controversial judgments over this period was Vinter124 which was widely misreported in 
the UK media. Here the Court determined that whilst it was possible for a whole life sentence to be 
compatible with Article 3, there needed to be a review at some point and it recommended this occur at 
around 25 years. As this was not adequately set out in UK law, the Court found a violation of Article 3 
leading some newspapers to report that the Court had ordered the release of numerous notorious 
murderers. Also controversial were judgments of the Court impacting on immigration decisions at the 
national level. These were not well received by the UK government and this was particularly acute 
where the Court held that the removal of Abu Qatada (Othman)125 to Jordan would be incompatible 
with Article 6 given the real risk of a flagrant denial of justice resulting from the possibility of the 
admission of torture evidence at his trial. Given the considerable national jurisprudence on the question, 
including a judgment of the UK Supreme Court, the judgment of the Court was particularly lengthy 
including international and comparative material to help show that it was appropriately reasoned. 
Over this period on many issues a dialogue was taking place between national courts and the ECtHR 
although it was a dialogue operating over a very long period of time and more often than not resulted in 
the Court reaching the same conclusion as the national courts, particularly where the Grand Chamber 
was considering a controversial issue. But this was not the case with its judgment in Al-Skeini126 one of 
the most controversial and far reaching of all the judgments of the Court concerning the UK. The Court 
determined that the Convention had a different and more extensive extraterritorial effect than that 
which the UK Supreme Court had given it. In short, it applied to the activities of UK armed forces in Iraq 
and there was therefore a duty on the UK to investigate the civilian deaths which had occurred. This 
dynamic change did not require legislation but national courts, once the judgment was adopted by the 
UK Supreme Court, interpreted the HRA in a similar fashion, giving it an extra-territorial reach it did not 
previously have. The Iraq Historic Allegations Team was set up to conduct investigations into this type of 
death. It is resourced until December 2019 and has a lifetime budget of £57.2 million.  
But this period stands out more for the number of static judgments where the Court found no violation 
of the ECHR particularly those concerning controversial issues which had already been exhaustively 
considered by national courts utilising the HRA. There are a number of examples. In Carson127 the Court 
held, in agreement with the highest national court, the House of Lords, that the failure of the UK to 
uprate pensions for the applicants, who were living abroad, was not in violation of Article 14 with Article 
1 Protocol 1. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was held to be compatible with Article 8 
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in Kennedy128. In Al-Khawaja and Tahery129 the Grand Chamber, taking careful note of judgment of the 
UK Supreme Court on the issue and also taking into account a variety of comparative material, 
determined that the admission of statements in criminal trials without the possibility of examination or 
cross examination of the witness was not automatically in violation of Article 6. In Austin130, again in 
agreement with the highest national court, the Court concluded that police ‘kettling’ or containment of 
demonstrators did not engage Article 5 as there was no deprivation of liberty. It was also held in Animal 
Defenders131 that the UK’s blanket ban on political advertising on radio or television was compatible 
with Article 10. The Court took particular note of the view of the national court and Parliament on the 
issue.  
In May 2010 a new coalition government between the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats took 
office. At first, respect for the Court was intact and judgments were implemented rather than openly 
defied or criticised. The violation found by the Grand Chamber in 2005 as a result of the blanket ban on 
prisoner voting132 had still not been remedied and in September 2010 the new government promised to 
do something about it. But rather than present a plan which was then to be implemented, it 
prevaricated and allowed the issue to blow out of all proportion becoming a magnet for all of those who 
wished to criticise the Court and the UK’s relationship with it. Prime Minister David Cameron showed 
little leadership and was reported to be exasperated and furious at having to implement the judgment. 
The matter was further politicised when a number of prisoners lodged applications with the Court on 
the same issue. Politicians from all political parties, including former Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw, 
opposed any reform which would enfranchise prisoners. By January 2011 the debate was out of 
proportion. In an editorial in The Times, it was stated as follows: 
If MPs decide that prisoners should not be granted the franchise, as they surely must, they 
should not be. If this defiance of rulings made in Strasbourg is to prove complicated, Mr 
Cameron must be clear that this is not a problem for over here, but one for over there.133 
The issue became a battle for national sovereignty with the Prime Minister calling for MPs to vote 
against allowing prisoners the vote and they voted by 234 to 22 to defy the ruling of the Court with the 
parliamentary debate centring on Parliament losing its sovereignty ‘the poodle of a European court’ 
according to David Ruffley MP. From then on, the issue of prisoner voting was mentioned every time the 
Court was mentioned, regardless of the context or the issue. In December 2013 a special parliamentary 
committee recommended that all inmates serving less than 12 months should get the vote. A new 
compromise was considered in March 2014 and in August 2014 the ECtHR determined that damages 
would not be awarded and no compensation and no costs to any prisoner applicant. Former Home 
Secretary Jack Straw wrote in the Times : 
The problem the Strasbourg court has created for itself – and for us – over the years has 
therefore lain not in the terms of the convention, but in the way in which the court stretched to 
                                                             
128 (Appl. No. 26839/05) 18 May 2010 
129 (Appl. No. 26766/05) 15 December 2011 
130 (Appl. No. 39692/09) 15 March 2012 
131 (Appl. No. 48876/08) 22 April 2013 
132 Hirst v UK (No.2) (Appl. No. 74025/01), 6 October 2005 
133 The Times, 20 January 2011 
19 
 
breaking point the intentions of those nations that signed the treaty. It has sought to turn itself 
into a supreme court for Europe . . one for which no democratic override was available.134 
Opinion pieces calling for withdrawal from the ECHR proliferated in national newspapers. The language 
the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary used in relation to national courts and the ECtHR 
deteriorated with both ‘appalled’ at the judgment of the Supreme Court in a HRA case and stating that 
‘it is about time we ensured that decisions are made in this Parliament rather than in the courts’. 
Human rights law was being blamed for many problems with Prime Minister David Cameron even linking 
human rights to the London riots of August 2011. Ambitious ministers and members of parliament 
criticised the Court in order to bolster their own personal ambitions. 
Abu Qatada (Othman) won his application in the ECtHR in January 2012 that his extradition to Jordan 
would be incompatible with Article 6. This prompted the Prime Minister David Cameron to warn that the 
ECtHR risked falling into disrepute ‘if it continues to overturn rulings by sovereign states’. On 25 January 
2012 in a speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, he said he wanted the Court to only deal with 
the most serious violations of human rights. Qatada was granted bail and ministers made clear their 
dismay. In an editorial The Times it was stated as follows: 
It is right that human rights be considered a supranational concern. Yet the ECHR’s actions once 
again look like an affront to national sovereignty, let alone common sense. Britain is still 
attempting to feel its way towards a solution to the same Court’s ruling last year that prisoners 
should be given the vote. . . This is Britain’s problem, but Strasbourg’s failure.135 
Following the judgment in Vinter the Prime Minister’s spokesman said he was ‘very, very, very, very 
disappointed and that he would not rule out withdrawing from the court if the Conservatives win the 
next general election.’ In October 2014 the Conservative Party published its plans to reform human 
rights law in the policy paper Protecting Human Rights in the UK.136 In the proposals, it is stated that the 
recent practice of the ECtHR ‘and the domestic legislation passed by Labour’ has damaged the credibility 
of human rights at home.137 The treatment of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ or the practice of 
‘evolutive interpretation’ by the Court was subject to strong criticism: 
Even allowing for necessary changes over the decades, the ECtHR has used its ‘living instrument 
doctrine’ to expand Convention rights into new areas, and certainly beyond what the framers of 
the Convention had in mind when they signed up to it.138 
The judgments of the Court utilised to illustrate the points made included: prisoner voting; artificial 
insemination for some prisoners;139 and (generally) the prevention of the deportation of foreign 
nationals who have committed crimes. The whole life tariff judgment of the Court in Vinter140 was also 
mentioned, although the interpretation of the judgment was incorrect. The plans for reform of the ECHR 
system included in the proposals were to make the judgments of the ECtHR ‘no longer binding over the 
UK Supreme Court’ and for it to be ‘no longer able to order a change in UK law’, as it was to become an 
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‘advisory body only’.141 It was promised that, should the Council of Europe not agree to this approach, 
the UK would withdraw from the ECHR.  
Over this period the ECtHR itself changed and allowed far more freedom for States to adopt a more 
flexible and nationally focussed interpretation of international human rights guarantees and 
jurisprudence. The UK has actually utilised the concept of consensus and living instrument in ECtHR 
litigation to its advantage in order to halt a more expansive interpretation.142 Spano writes of the ‘age of 
subsidiarity’ and states that the Court is consistently demonstrating its willingness to ‘defer to the 
reasoned and thoughtful assessment by national authorities of their Convention obligations’ utilising the 
judgment of the Court in Animal Defenders v UK143 and Protocols 15 and 16 to support his argument.144  
The ECtHR does take account of the processes of national authorities in its determination of the margin 
of appreciation. Saul has referred to the ‘growing body of case law that supports the thesis of deeper 
subsidiarity in relation to parliaments’.145 Mahoney writes of the role played by national courts: 
 . . the closer the analysis of the national courts reflects the European Convention and its case-
law, the more likely the finding will be that the national courts have remained within the 
domestic margin of appreciation . . There will be less temptation for the Strasbourg Court to 
engage in micro-management of individual situations or even in reviewing the preceding policy-
making and, thus, less inclination to disturb the rulings of the national courts if the national 
courts are visibly operating domestic remedies with an eye to compliance with Convention 
standards and case law.146 
As Mahoney notes, UK courts have a much greater chance of retaining control of the interpretation and 
application of human rights law if a co-operative, rather than a ‘hierarchical or competitive relationship’ 
is maintained.147 Where State authorities do a good job, fulfilling their responsibilities as the primary 
guarantors of Convention rights, the ECtHR will respect this.148 It is also becoming increasingly harder for 
applicants to access the Court, although this has also generated some criticism.149 Over the years UK 
judges have become far more adept at carefully adjudicating in HRA cases so as to secure respect for 
their work should it end upon on review before the ECtHR. In some instances: 
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British courts can now exert strong influence [on the ECtHR], changing the course of Convention 
jurisprudence for all Contracting States, and help to ensure that where the UK wishes to 
maintain a national position on an important issue, such as its ban on political advertising, this is 
far more possible than might have otherwise been the case.150 
2015-2017 
It is not surprising that in the three years following the most vehement attacks on the Court to date that 
the number of judgments has declined and that there has been an even more marked shift towards 
static judgments. Violations have been found in relation to issues which have been problematic for some 
time – prisoner voting, delays in Parole Board hearings and immigration detention but there has been 
only one judgment over this period with a slight dynamic element. In RE151 the Court found that some 
aspects of surveillance legislation were not in accordance with law and a violation of Article 8 was found 
which was swiftly rectified. 
Apart from these, almost all of the judgments over this period have been static. Some were simple 
reconsiderations of fact scenarios and no violation found. Others concerned more controversial issues 
and the finding of no violation signalling a new willingness on the part of the Court to stay out of 
matters which had been exhaustively considered by national courts adjudicating with the HRA. For 
example, in Fazia Ali v UK152 the Court held that the inability to appeal to an independent and impartial 
tribunal on a social housing matter was not in violation of Article 6 as the judicial scrutiny available via 
judicial review was sufficient to satisfy Article 6. In Da Silva153 it held that a decision not to prosecute 
was not in violation of Article 2 and that the procedural obligations incurred under Article 2 did not 
extend this far. Ibrahim154 concerned the controversial issue of lack of access to a lawyer during the 
initial questioning at a police station and admission of statements obtained at a subsequent trial. No 
violation of Article 6 was found in relation to the first three applicants although a violation was found in 
relation to the fourth applicant. 
The British Gurkha Welfare Society was unsuccessful in its argument that their lower pension 
entitlement compared to other ex-service personnel was incompatible with Article 14.155 The Grand 
Chamber in Hutchinson156 settled the controversy which had arisen following the judgment in Vinter by 
finding that the problem with lack of clarity concerning the period at which the review of a whole life 
sentence would take place had been resolved by a judgment of the UK Court of Appeal and the violation 
of Article 3 had been remedied. Finally, immigration rules guiding judicial discretion when removal is 
alleged incompatible with Article 8 were put to the test in Ndidi157 and the Court found no violation of 
Article 8 stating as follows: 
The requirement for “European supervision” does not mean that in determining whether an 
impugned measure struck a fair balance between the relevant interests, it is necessarily the 
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Court’s task to conduct the Article 8 proportionality assessment afresh. On the contrary, in 
Article 8 cases the Court has generally understood the margin of appreciation to mean that, 
where the independent and impartial domestic courts have carefully examined the facts, 
applying the relevant human rights standards consistently with the Convention and its case-law, 
and adequately balanced the applicant’s personal interests against the more general public 
interest in the case, it is not for it to substitute its own assessment of the merits (including, in 
particular, its own assessment of the factual details of proportionality) for that of the competent 
national authorities. The only exception to this is where there are shown to be strong reasons 
for doing so . . 158 
There was still criticism of the Court from government up until the June 2016 referendum on leaving the 
EU. High profile support for withdrawal from the ECHR was provided by current Prime Minister Theresa 
May, who, when Home Secretary in April 2016, gave a speech supporting the UK staying in the EU, but 
leaving the ECHR, illustrating her case with the deportations of Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada,159 which 
had been delayed by applications to the ECtHR, and the fact that the ECtHR ‘tried to tell Parliament that 
– however we voted – we could not deprive prisoners of the vote’. She summed up her opinion of the 
Court as follows: 
The ECtHR can bind the hands of Parliament, adds nothing to our prosperity, makes us less 
secure by preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign nationals – and does nothing to 
change the attitudes of governments like Russia’s when it comes to human rights.160 
In 2016, with the change in government leadership following the decision to implement the Brexit 
referendum result and leave the European Union, the Conservative government’s hard-line stance on 
the ECtHR has softened a little. The Conservative Party formed a government again following the 2017 
general election but all focus is now on Brexit. The promise is not to repeal or replace the HRA whilst the 
process of Brexit is underway and to ‘remain signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights 
for the duration of the next parliament.’161  
Conclusion 
The UK provides an interesting study of how the relationship between a state and the ECtHR can 
develop over time. Over more than 40 years the relationship has gone from one that was almost always 
dynamic to one that is now almost always static. The experience of the UK shows that a dynamic 
relationship can flourish in the absence of effective national human rights protection through law. But 
this is not the only factor necessary. There must also be a sufficient number of applications flowing to 
the Court, respect for the Court from leading political actors, as well as a willingness to appreciate that 
the UK institutions may have overlooked something important or made a mistake. Furthermore, there 
must be willingness to remedy the violation as found by the Court, to the satisfaction of the Committee 
of Ministers, and the political leadership to implement a change in the national approach. This is best 
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illustrated by the approach of the Court to Article 13 and the lack of remedies in the UK. Whilst at first 
the Court found the absence of national remedies was in violation of Article 13, it quickly 
accommodated the message from government that the UK was not ready for incorporation or a bill of 
rights. Article 13 violations were only found again once the HRA was in place.  
By contrast, a relationship between a state and the Court is more likely to be static where there is 
effective national human rights protection through law. Over the years the Court has adjusted its own 
principles of interpretation to better respect the outcomes from states where national institutions have 
carefully considered human rights issues before acting. The experience of the UK also illustrates that a 
vigorous national campaign against the Court, and the threat of withdrawal from the ECHR, can also 
contribute to the relationship becoming a more static one. 
But it is important not to give the impression that just because the relationship between the UK and the 
ECtHR is currently static, the relationship is no longer of any value to a state committed to the 
protection of human rights through law. The Court continues to act as a strong disincentive where there 
is a temptation to breach the ECHR. It provides justice and a remedy to those who might not have a 
remedy at the national level for the violation of their rights. And it can help to maintain the status quo in 
the UK by confirming the national courts’ interpretation and application of human rights norms to 
controversial issues, granting a finality to national debates and confirming that the UK’s commitment to 
protecting human rights through law is working. 
However, the downsides to a permanently static relationship must also be appreciated. For the continued 
effectiveness and survival of the ECHR system of protection, it is important for the judgments of the 
ECtHR, and the system as a whole, to be perceived as legitimate by applicants, NGOs and other 
stakeholders as well. This should not be underestimated, as Alter has observed: 
[…]  where ICs [international courts] lack domestic support constituencies, governments can 
defend non-compliance with international rules as consistent with the domestic rule of law. But 
where there are government and nongovernmental actors who do prefer to follow international 
law, ICs can help construct coalitions of counterpressures that alter the political balance in 
favour of policies that better cohere with international legal obligations. … ICs become 
politically weak not because governments oppose them. … Rather, ICs become politically weak 
when legal and policy defenders will not organise to demand that governments adhere to the 
particular legal covenants or to the particular interpretations of the law the IC is promoting.162 
The disappointment with recent judgments where the ECtHR has found the UK not in violation of the 
EHCR is growing, and questions of legitimacy are being raised by various non-governmental actors. 
According to Fenwick, ‘reliance on finding a European consensus in socially sensitive contexts can 
merely lead to acceptance of detrimental treatment of groups traditionally vulnerable to 
discrimination.’163 Draghici observed that ‘methodologically flawed findings . . . expose the Court to 
criticism and mistrust’,164 and in Henrard’s opinion, the Court may well be losing the very legitimacy it is 
trying to maintain when it sacrifices the effective protection of fundamental rights to ‘keep states on 
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board’.165 Judgments like Animal Defenders International, in which the weight of consensus clearly 
indicated a different conclusion from that reached by the Court, can be perceived as arbitrary and, in 
the opinion of some, an example of a Court deciding in accordance with its assumption of what the 
system can bear, rather than deciding in accordance with the weight of persuasive authority and other 
important principles.166 
On the other hand, it might be time to accept that the Court’s role in prompting new directions in the 
protection of human rights in the UK is now much reduced, particularly in light of the fact that national 
human rights protection under the HRA, at least for the moment, encourages detailed consideration of 
these issues by the legislature, executive or judiciary prior to an application to the ECtHR. In short, as 
McGoldrick notes, on some issues, such as the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination, progress 
at the national level may achieve more than the Council of Europe: 
[…]  strategic litigation and advocacy relying on domestic constitutional and legislative equality 
or non-discrimination provisions, sometimes with the use of international or transnational 
jurisprudence to assist progressive interpretations … may carry a greater domestic legitimacy and 
authority than international jurisprudence.167 
For a state such as the UK, with, at present, strong national human rights protection, procedurally and 
substantively the same as that offered by the ECHR and ECtHR, an independent and impartial judiciary, 
and a relatively robust civil society, it may be that more can be achieved at the national level, in effect, 
saving the ECtHR from getting involved in difficult and sensitive issues, and preserving the Convention 
system for those States experiencing more pressing and gross violations of Convention rights. 
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